Abstracts of Working Papers:

“Overconfidence and the Disclosure of Proprietary Information”

(Solo authored and based on my dissertation)
“This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence is associated with the disclosure of proprietary information. I use characteristics of research and development activities (R&D) and capital investments (CAPX) to provide within-firm variation in proprietary disclosure costs. I begin by verifying that narrative R&D disclosures have higher levels of proprietary disclosure costs than narrative CAPX disclosures. I predict and find evidence consistent with overconfident CEOs disclosing significantly more about R&D, and not more about CAPX, than their non-overconfident counterparts. The results are robust to a number of alternative model specifications and suggest that the results are not due to endogenous firm-CEO matching or overconfident CEOs selecting systematically different investment levels. Additional analysis indicates that disclosures made by overconfident CEOs are more likely to contain forward-looking or uncertain information. The results of this study are consistent with overconfident CEOs perceiving proprietary disclosure costs to be lower, leading to more disclosure of proprietary information.”

“Bridging the Gap: Evidence from externally hired CEOs”

“In-Principle Acceptance” at the Journal of Accounting Research
(with Yonca Ertimur, Jonathan Rogers, and Sarah Zechman)
“We investigate executive employment gaps (hereafter, gaps) between the appointment of an external CEO at a public firm and the individual’s prior executive position at a public company. These gaps cannot be reliably obtained from common databases. We hand collect data for externally hired CEOs at public companies from 1992-2014. These CEOs represent approximately 40% of the 5,095 CEO successions and have a mean gap of 1.9 years. The gap increases to 3.2 years for the subset of new hires with a gap. We hypothesize that labor market frictions and executive skillsets contribute to the existence and length of these gaps. Using theories from labor economics, we predict (equilibrium) associations between two measures of “fit” (executive compensation and long-term match quality) and gaps (both existence and length). Finally, we provide descriptive evidence on what executives do (e.g., sit on boards, work for private consulting companies, or consume leisure) during their gaps. This project went through the registered report process.”

Works in Process:

“Changes in Self-Selected Peers Around Operational Changes”

(with Frances Tice)

“Do Investors Underreact to Changes in R&D? The role of discretionary disclosure for valuing R&D”